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IISER Pune, Dr. Homi Bhabha Road, Pashan, Pune 411008, INDIA.
Abstract. In this paper we study the MOR cryptosystem with finite Chevalley groups.
There are four infinite families of finite classical Chevalley groups. These are: special
linear groups SL(d, q), orthogonal groups O(d, q) and symplectic groups Sp(d, q). The
family O(d, q) splits to two different families of Chevalley groups depending on the parity
of d. The MOR cryptosystem over SL(d, q) was studied by the first author, “A simple
generalization of the ElGamal cryptosystem to non-abelian groups II, Communications
in Algebra 40 (2012), no. 9, 3583–3596”. In that case, the hardness of the MOR cryp-
tosystem was found to be equivalent to the discrete logarithm problem in Fqd . In this
paper, we show that the MOR cryptosystem over Sp(d, q) has the security of the dis-
crete logarithm problem in Fqd . However, it seems likely that the security of the MOR
cryptosystem for the family of orthogonal groups is F
qd
2 . We also develop an analog of
row-column operations in orthogonal and symplectic groups.
1. Introduction
Public-key cryptography is a backbone of this modern society. However with recent
advances in the index-calculus algorithm to solve the discrete logarithm prob-
lem in finite fields of small characteristic by Joux [2,14], and its possible implication
to factoring algorithms, it seems that we are left with only one cryptographic primitive
– the discrete logarithm problem in the group of rational points of an elliptic curve over
a finite field. So it seems prudent that we set out in search for new cryptographic primi-
tives and subsequently new cryptosystems. The obvious question is: how to search and
where to look? One can look into several well-known hard problems in Mathematics
and hope to create a trap-door function or one can try to generalize the known, trusted
cryptosystems.
This paper is in the direction of generalizing a known cryptosystem with the hope that
something practical and useful will come out of this generalization. A new but arbitrary
cryptosystem might not be considered by the community as a secure cryptosystem for
decades. So our approach is conservative but practical.
The cryptosystem that we have in mind is the MOR cryptosystem [17–19]. It is a
simple but powerful generalization of the well known and classic ElGamal cryptosystem.
In this cryptosystem the discrete logarithm problem works in the automorphism group of
a group instead of the group. As a matter of fact, it can work in the automorphism group
of most algebraic structures. However, we will limit ourselves to finite groups. One way
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to look at the MOR cryptosystem is that it generalizes the discrete logarithm problem
from a cyclic (sub)group to an arbitrary group.
The MOR cryptosystem over SL(d, q) was studied earlier [17] and the work for finite
p-groups is due to appear [18]. It became clear that working with matrix groups of size d
over Fq and with automorphisms that act by conjugation, like the inner automorphism,
there are two possible reductions of the security to finite fields. It is the security of the
discrete logarithm problem in Fqd or Fqd2 [17, Section 7]. This reduction is similar to the
embedding of the discrete logarithm problem in the group of rational points of an elliptic
curve to a finite field, the degree of the extension of that field over the field of definition
of the elliptic curve is called the embedding degree. In the case of SL(d, q), it became the
security of Fqd. The reason that we undertook this study, is to see, if the security in other
classical Chevalley groups is Fqd or Fqd2 .
Though in cryptography it is often hard to come up with theorems about security of a
cryptosystem, we were able to show that the attack that embeds the security of SL(d, q) to
a discrete logarithm problem in Fqd works for symplectic groups as well. However, at this
moment it seems likely that the security of the MOR cryptosystem in orthogonal groups
O(d, q) is F
qd
2 . The way we implement this cryptosystem is by solving the word problem
in generators. It presents no advantage to small characteristic. In the light of Joux’s [2]
improvement of the index-calculus attack in small characteristic, this contribution of the
MOR cryptosystem is remarkable.
In summary, the proposed MOR cryptosystem is totally different from the known
ElGamal cryptosystems from a functional point of view. Its implementation depends on
row-column operations and substitutions(substituting a matrix for a word in generators).
However, we do have a concrete and tangible understanding of its security.
1.1. Finite groups that we consider in this paper. In this paper, we work with finite
fields of odd characteristic. We work with classical Chevalley groups O(2l+1, q), Sp(2l, q)
and O(2l, q) of Bl, Cl and Dl type respectively for l ≥ 2. Note that the group SL(l+1, q)
of Al type has been dealt with earlier [17]. Our analysis and the subsequent conclusions
hold for central (and subgroups of the center) quotients of the above mentioned groups
and with any proper characteristic subgroups, like the commutator of the above groups.
In this paper, we do not consider twisted classical Chevalley groups, also called Steinberg
groups. These are the 2Al(q) type which is the unitary group U(l+ 1, q) and
2Dl(q) type
which is the orthogonal group O−(2l, q) [5, Section 14.5]. We hope to continue our study
with these groups in subsequent publications.
1.2. Structure of the paper. This paper is a study of the MOR cryptosystem using
the orthogonal and symplectic groups over finite fields of odd characteristic.
In Section 2, we describe the MOR cryptosystem in some details. We emphasize that
the MOR cryptosystem is a natural generalization of the classic ElGamal cryptosystem.
In Section 3, we describe the orthogonal and symplectic groups and their automorphisms.
In Section 6, we describe two new algorithms. These algorithms use the row-column oper-
ations to write an element in the orthogonal or symplectic group as a word in generators.
This is very similar to the row-column operations in special linear groups. These algo-
rithms are useful in the implementation of the MOR cryptosystem. These algorithms are
also of independent interest in computational group theory. We conclude this paper with
some implementation details.
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1.3. Notations and terminology. It was bit hard for us to pick notations for this
paper. The notations used by a Lie group theorist is somewhat different from that of
a computational group theorist.We tried to preserve the essence of notations as much
as possible. For example, a Lie group theorist will use SLl+1(q) to denote what we will
denote by SL(l+1, q) or SL(d, q). We have used TX to denote the transpose of the matrix
X. This was necessary to avoid any confusion that might arise when using X−1 and TX
simultaneously. In this paper, we use K and Fq interchangeably, while each of them is a
finite field of odd characteristic. All other notations used are standard.
2. The MOR Cryptosystem
The MOR cryptosystem is a natural generalization of the classic ElGamal cryptosys-
tem. It was first proposed by Paeng et. al. [19]. To elaborate the idea behind a MOR
cryptosystem we take a slightly expository route. For the purpose of this exposition, we
define the discrete logarithm problem. It is one of the most common cryptographic
primitive in use. It works in any cyclic (sub)group G = 〈g〉, but is not secure in any
cyclic group.
Definition 2.1 (The discrete logarithm problem). The discrete logarithm problem in
G = 〈g〉 is, given g and gm find m.
The word “find” in the above definition is bit vague, in this paper we mean compute
m. The hardness to solve the discrete logarithm problem depends on the presentation
of the group and is not an invariant under isomorphism. It is believed that the discrete
logarithm problem is secure in the multiplicative group of a finite field and the group
of rational points of an elliptic curve. The security in elliptic curves is considered much
better than that of finite fields because of non-existence of sub-exponential algorithms in
most cases of elliptic curves [1, 21].
A more important cryptographic primitive, related to the discrete logarithm problem
is the Diffie-Hellman problem, also known as the computational Diffie-Hellman
problem.
Definition 2.2 (Diffie-Hellman problem). Given g, gm1 and gm2 find gm1m2.
It is clear, if one solves the discrete logarithm problem then the Diffie-Hellman problem
is solved as well. The other direction is not known.
The most prolific cryptosystem in use today is the ElGamal cryptosystem. It uses the
cyclic group G = 〈g〉. It is defined as follows:
2.1. The ElGamal cryptosystem.
A cyclic group G = 〈g〉 is public.
• Public-key: Let g and gm is public.
• Private-key: The integer m is private.
Encryption:
To encrypt a plaintext M ∈ G, get an arbitrary integer r ∈ [1, |G|] compute gr and grm.
The ciphertext is (gr,Mgrm).
Decryption:
After receiving the ciphertext (gr,Mgrm), the user uses the private key m. So she com-
putes gmr from gr and them computes M.
It is well known that the hardness of the ElGamal cryptosystem is equivalent to the
Diffie-Hellman problem [13, Proposition 2.10].
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2.2. The MOR cryptosystem. In the case of the MOR cryptosystem, one works with
the automorphism group of a group. An automorphism group can be defined on any
algebraic structure and subsequently a MOR cryptosystem can also be defined on that
automorphism group, however in this paper we restrict ourselves to finite groups. Further-
more, we look at classical groups defined by generators and automorphisms are defined
as actions on those generators.
Let G = 〈g1, g2, . . . , gs〉 be a finite group. Let φ be a non-identity automorphism.
• Public-key: Let {φ(gi)}
s
i=1 and {φ
m(gi)}
s
i=1 is public.
• Private-key: The integer m is private.
Encryption:
To encrypt a plaintext M ∈ G, get an arbitrary integer r ∈ [1, |φ|] compute φr and φrm.
The ciphertext is (φr, φrm (M)).
Decryption:
After receiving the ciphertext (φr, φrm (M)), the user knows the private key m. So she
computes φmr from φr and then computes M.
Theorem 2.1. The hardness to break the above MOR cryptosystem is equivalent to the
Diffie-Hellman problem in the group 〈φ〉.
Proof. It is easy to see that if one can break the Diffie-Hellman problem then one can
compute φmr from φm in the public-key and φr in the ciphertext. This breaks the system.
On the other hand, observe that the plaintext is φ−mr (φmr(M)). Assume that there
is an oracle that can break the MOR cryptosystem, i.e., given φ, φm and a plaintext
(φr, g) will deliver φ−mr(g). Now we query the oracle s times with the public-key and
the ciphertext (φr, gi) for i = 1, 2 . . . , s. From the output one can easily find φ
mr(gi) for
i = 1, 2, . . . , s. So we just witnessed that for φm and φr one can compute φmr using the
oracle. This solves the Diffie-Hellman problem. •
In a practical implementation of a MOR cryptosystem there are two things that matter
the most.
a: The number of generators. As we saw that the automorphism φ is presented as
action on generators. Larger the number of generators bigger is the public-key.
b: Efficient algorithm to solve the word problem. This means, givenG = 〈g1, g2, . . . , gs〉
and g ∈ G, is there an efficient algorithm to write g as word in g1, g2, . . . , gs? The
reason of this importance is immediate – the automorphisms are presented as ac-
tion on generators and if one has to compute φ(g), then the word problem must
be solved.
The obvious question is: what are the right groups for the MOR cryptosystem? In this
paper, we pursue a study of the MOR cryptosystem using finite Chevalley groups of
classical type, in particular, orthogonal and symplectic groups.
3. Classical Groups
In this section, we produce a brief overview of the Chevalley groups of classical type.We
introduce orthogonal and symplectic groups. References for this section are Carter [5]
and Grove [9]. We also briefly describe similitude groups which are required for a study
of diagonal automorphisms of the Chevalley groups. In this section we fix notation which
will be used throughout this paper.
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Let V be a vector space of dimension d over a field K of odd characteristic. Let
β : V ×V → K be a bilinear form. By fixing a basis of V we can associate a matrix to β.
We shall abuse the notation slightly and denote the matrix of the bilinear form by β itself.
Thus β(x, y) = Txβy where x, y are column vectors. We will work with non-degenerate
bilinear forms and that means det β 6= 0. A symmetric or skew-symmetric bilinear form
β satisfies β = Tβ or β = −Tβ respectively.
Definition 3.1 (Orthogonal Groups). A square matrix X of size d is called orthogonal
if TXβX = β where β is symmetric. It is well known that the orthogonal matrices form
a group known as the orthogonal group.
Definition 3.2 (Symplectic Group). A square matrix of size d is called symplectic if
TXβX = β where β is skew-symmetric. And the set of symplectic matrices form symplectic
group.
We write the dimension of V as d = 2l+1 or d = 2l for l ≥ 1. We fix a basis and index
it by 0, 1, 2, . . . , l,−1,−2, . . . ,−l for odd dimension and by 1, 2, . . . , l,−1,−2, . . . ,−l for
even dimension. We consider the non-degenerate bilinear forms β on V given by the
following matrices:
• Type Bl: The form β is symmetric with d = 2l + 1 and β =

2 0 00 0 Il
0 Il 0

.
• Type Cl: The form β is skew-symmetric with d = 2l and β =
(
0 Il
−Il 0
)
.
• Type Dl: The form β is symmetric with d = 2l and β =
(
0 Il
Il 0
)
.
where Il is the identity matrix of size l over K.
Let K(= Fq) be a finite field of odd characteristic. If d is odd there is only one
orthogonal group up to conjugation [9, Page79] and thus we can fix β as above of Bl type.
In this case the orthogonal group is simply denoted by O(2l + 1, q). Up to equivalence
there is only one non-degenerate skew-symmetric form in even dimension [9, Theorem
2.10]. We fix β of Cl type as above. Thus there is only one symplectic group up to
conjugation denoted by Sp(2l, q). However up to conjugation there are two different
orthogonal groups [9, Page 79] in even dimension d = 2l. In this paper, we work with
only one of them corresponding to the β fixed as above of type Dl. We denote this
orthogonal group by O(2l, q). The other orthogonal group often denoted as O−(2l, q) is
twisted Chevalley group denoted as 2Dl(q), also called Steinberg groups.
Definition 3.3 (Orthogonal similitude groups). The orthogonal similitude group is de-
fined as the set of matrices X of size d as follows: GO(d, q) = {X ∈ GL(d, q) | TXβX =
µβ, µ ∈ F×q } where d = 2l + 1 or 2l and β is of type Bl and Dl respectively.
Definition 3.4 (Symplectic similitude group). The symplectic similitude group is denoted
by GSp(2l, q) = {X ∈ GL(2l, K) | TXβX = µβ, µ ∈ F×q } where β is of type Cl.
Here µ depends on the matrix X and is called the similitude factor. The similitude
factor µ defines a group homomorphism from the similitude group to F×q and the kernel is
the orthogonal group O(d, q) when β is symmetric and symplectic group Sp(2l, q) when β
is skew-symmetric respectively [15, Section 12]. Note that scalar matrices λI for λ ∈ F×q
belong to the center of similitude groups. The similitude groups are thought of analog of
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what GL(d, q) is for SL(d, q). For a discussion of the diagonal automorphisms of Chevalley
groups we need the diagonal subgroups of the similitude groups.
Definition 3.5 (Diagonal group). The diagonal groups are defined to be the group of
non-singular diagonal matrices in the corresponding similitude group and are as follows:
in the case of GO(2l + 1, q) it is
{diag(α, λ1, · · · , λl, µλ
−1
1 , · · · , µλ
−1
l ) | λ1, . . . , λl, α
2 = µ ∈ F×q }
and in the case of GO(2l, q) and GSp(2l, q) it is
{diag(λ1, · · · , λl, µλ
−1
1 , · · · , µλ
−1
l ) | λ1, . . . , λl, µ ∈ F
×
q }.
Conjugation by these diagonal elements produce diagonal automorphisms in the re-
spective Chevalley groups.
We denote by Ωd(q) the commutator subgroup of the orthogonal group O(d, q). It
is a index 2 subgroup of the special orthogonal group SO(d, q). We fix a generator of
SO(d, q)/Ωd(q) as d(ζ) = diag(1, 1, . . . , 1, ζ, 1, . . . , 1, ζ
−1) where ζ is a fixed non-square in
Fq [9, Theorem 9.7]. Further, the group SO(d, q) is of index 2 in O(d, q) and we fix a
generator for the quotient as wl = I−el,l−e−l,−l−el,−l−e−l,l where ei,j denotes a matrix
with 1 at (i, j)th place and 0 everywhere else.
3.1. Chevalley Generators. To work with Chevalley groups we need a set of generators
for these groups. We describe the Chevalley generators from the theory of Chevalley
groups [5]. For sake of completeness of this paper, we will briefly go through the theory
of Chevalley groups in the next section. In what follows t varies over Fq.
(1) The group SL(l + 1, q) is generated by the matrices xi,j(t) = I + tei,j where
1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ l + 1. This is Chevalley group of Al type.
(2) For 1 ≤ i, j ≤ l, the group Ω2l+1(q) is generated by the following matrices:
xi,j(t) = I + t(ei,j − e−j,−i) for i 6= j,
xi,−j(t) = I + t(ei,−j − ej,−i), for i < j,
x−i,j(t) = I + t(e−i,j − e−j,i) for i < j,
xi,0(t) = I + t(2ei,0 − e0,−i)− t
2ei,−i,
x0,i(t) = I + t(−2e−i,0 + e0,i)− t
2e−i,i.
With these generators the elements d(ζ) = diag(1, 1, · · · , 1, ζ︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
, 1, · · · , 1, ζ−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
) and
wl = I− el,l− e−l,−l− el,−l− e−l,l generate the orthogonal group O(2l+1, q). This
is Chevalley group of Bl type.
(3) For 1 ≤ i, j ≤ l, the group Sp(2l, q) is generated by the matrices
xi,j(t) = I + t(ei,j − e−j,−i) for i 6= j,
xi,−j(t) = I + t(ei,−j + ej,−i) for i < j,
x−i,j(t) = I + t(e−i,j + e−j,i) for i < j,
xi,−i(t) = I + tei,−i
x−i,i(t) = I + te−i,i.
This is Chevalley group of Cl type.
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(4) For 1 ≤ i, j ≤ l, the group Ω2l(q) is generated by the matrices
xi,j(t) = I + t(ei,j − e−j,−i) for i 6= j,
xi,−j(t) = I + t(ei,−j − ej,−i) for i < j,
x−i,j(t) = I + t(e−i,j − e−j,i) for i < j.
With the above generators the elements d(ζ) = diag(1, . . . , 1, ζ︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
, 1, . . . , 1, ζ−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
) and
wl = I − el,l − e−l,−l − el,−l − e−l,l generate the orthogonal group O(2l, q). This is
Chevalley group of Dl type.
It is interesting to note that our algorithm in Section 6 to solve the word problem in
Chevalley groups using the above generators gives yet another proof that the matrices
listed above generate the corresponding groups.
4. Adjoint Chevalley Groups
In this section we introduce adjoint Chevalley groups. One could get around without
reading this section, we include this to explain why the generators listed in Section 3.1
are natural. The material is not that important to understand the later part of this
paper. It is probably impossible to produce a brief and comprehensive introduction to
Chevalley groups. The usual route to describe a Chevalley group is as a subgroup of
the automorphism group of a simple Lie algebra. A Lie algebra over a field is a finite
dimensional vector space with a Lie bracket operation. We are particularly interested
in simple Lie algebras over C. The theory was originally developed by Chevalley [6].
Though our exposition follows Carter [5] and Steinberg [23]. A more general account of
this theory over commutative rings can be found in Vavilov [24].
We are particularly interested in simple Lie algebras over C. One dimensional Lie
algebras are always simple and uninteresting. It is known that a Lie algebra contains a
self-normalizing nilpotent subalgebra H called the Cartan subalgebra. In case of simple
Lie algebras the Cartan subalgebra contains only semi-simple elements. Corresponding
to a Cartan subalgebra H, we can define a decomposition of the simple Lie algebra L
by looking at the simultaneous decomposition as eigen-spaces. So we can write L =
H
⊕
⊕r∈ΦLr where Lr are one dimensional subspaces of L satisfying [h, er] = r(h)er
where r : H → C, er is the generator of Lr and Φ is finite subset of H
∗, the dual of H.
This is called a Cartan decomposition of L [5, Section 3.2].
The set Φ obtained using Cartan decomposition is the root system for the Lie algebra
L. An abstract root system [5, Definition 2.1.1] is a finite subset of an Euclidean space of
the same dimension as H. By fixing an order in the Euclidean space we get a system of
positive roots Φ+ and negative roots Φ− so that Φ = Φ+ ∪Φ−. Let Π = {p1, . . . , pl} be a
system of simple roots, i.e., any root is either non-positive or non-negative integer linear
combination of simple roots. We denote by hr = 2r/(r, r) the co-root corresponding
to the root r, where (. , .) is the usual inner-product on the Euclidean space containing
the roots. It is a theorem of Chevalley that there is a basis {hr, r ∈ Π; er, r ∈ Φ} of L
satisfying the following [5, Theorem 4.2.1]:
[er, e−r] = hr,
[er, es] = 0 if r + s 6∈ Φ else [er, es] = ±(p + 1)er+s where r 6= ±s,
[hr, hs] = 0,
[hr, es] = Arses,
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where −pr+s, . . . ,−r+s, s, r+s, . . . , qr+s is a r-chain passing through s and Ars =
2(r,s)
(r,r)
are integers known as the Cartan integers. Such a basis is called a Chevalley basis [5,
Section 4.2].
There is a well-known classification of finite dimensional simple Lie algebras over C [5,
Section 3.6]. They are classified via their Dynkin diagram. There are four infinite families
Al(l ≥ 1), Bl(l ≥ 2), Cl(l ≥ 3) and Dl(l ≥ 4) together called simple Lie algebras of
"classical type" and five "exceptional types" G2, F4, E6, E7 and E8. In Section 4.1 we
explicitly describe the classical Lie algebras and their Chevalley basis which will be used
to form adjoint Chevalley groups. From now on L is one of Al, Bl, Cl or Dl.
Let K(= Fq) be a finite field of odd characteristic. We denote by LZ the Z-span of a
Chevalley basis in L. Clearly LZ is a Lie algebra over Z. Define LK = K ⊗ LZ. Then
one can define a Lie algebra structure on LK as follows:
[1⊗ x, 1⊗ y] := 1⊗ [x, y]
for basis elements x, y and extended by linearity. Thus LK is a Lie algebra over K.
To define the groups of our interest we need to work with certain operators which are
in Aut(LK). For this we start by defining xr(ζ) := exp(ζad(er)) ∈ Aut(L) for r ∈ Φ
and ζ ∈ C. Where ad is the Lie algebra homomorphism ad : L → End (L) given by
ad(x).y = [x, y]. These operators xr are unipotent operators whose matrix entries are
polynomials in ζ with integer coefficients. Thus by substituting t ∈ K for the variable ζ
and reducing the coefficients modulo the characteristic of the field K, we get operators
xr(t) ∈ Aut(LK). The adjoint Chevalley group of type L over K is the subgroup of
Aut(LK) generated by xr(t) for all r ∈ Φ and t ∈ K, and is denoted by
L(K) := 〈xr(t) | r ∈ Φ, t ∈ K〉 .
One can explicitly write down xr(t) as an automorphism of LK on the basis elements as
follows:
xr(t).er = er,
xr(t).e−r = e−r + thr − t
2er,
xr(t).hs = hs − Asrter for s ∈ Π,
xr(t).es =
∑q
i=0Mr,s,it
iei,r+s if r 6= ±s
where Mr,s,i = ±
(
p+i
i
)
and r, s ∈ Φ. In this paper we are working with classical Chevalley
groups which are explicitly described in Section 4.1.
For a fixed r, the subgroup Xr generated by elements xr(t) for all t ∈ K, is called a
root subgroup and is isomorphic to the additive group of K. Let U := 〈Xr | r ∈ Φ
+〉 and
V := 〈Xr | r ∈ Φ
−〉 be subgroups of L(K). Then both U and V are unipotent as well as
nilpotent groups. Furthermore these are Sylow p-subgroups of L(K). For every r ∈ Φ
there is a surjective homomorphism [5, Theorem 6.3.1] φr : SL(2, K) → 〈Xr, X−r〉 which
maps
(
1 t
0 1
)
to xr(t) and
(
1 0
t 1
)
to x−r(t). Let us define hr(λ) as φr
(
λ 0
0 λ−1
)
and
nr(t) as φr
(
0 t
−t−1 0
)
. Set nr = nr(1) for convenience. We now define some important
subgroups H := 〈hr(t) | r ∈ Φ, t ∈ K
×〉 and N := 〈H, nr | r ∈ Φ〉.
For our discussion of diagonal automorphisms we need a slightly larger group. Let
P = ZΦ be the root lattice and Q be the weight lattice (Z span of the dual of co-
roots) [5, Section 7.1]. We know that P ⊂ Q. It is known that:
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Simple Lie Algebra Q/P
Al Z/(l + 1)Z
Bl, Cl Z/2Z
Dl Z/4Z if l odd
Z/2Z× Z/2Z if l even
There is a well known isomorphism [5, Section 7.1] h : Hom(P,K×) → Hˆ ⊂ Aut(LK)
given by χ 7→ h(χ) where h(χ).hs = hs and h(χ).es = χ(s)es. Furthermore H ⊂ Hˆ
and h(χ) ∈ H if the character χ can be extended to a character of Q. The group Hˆ
normalizes U and V and hence L(K) (refer to the note following [5, Theorem 7.1.1]).
Further L(K) ∩ Hˆ = H . Let Gˆ ⊂ Aut(LK) be the subgroup generated by L(K) and Hˆ .
Then L(K) is a normal subgroup of Gˆ and Gˆ/L(K) ∼= Hˆ/H .
We are working with Chevalley groups of classical type which we now describe explicitly.
4.1. Chevalley Groups of Classical types. In this section, we describe the Chevalley
groups of classical type following Carter [5, Section 11.2 and 11.3]. In each case, we
first describe the complex simple Lie algebra. These are subalgebra of the full matrix
algebra M(d,C), square matrices of size d over C, with bracket operation [X, Y ] =
XY − Y X. Then we get a Chevalley basis as described earlier and a Lie algebra over Z
and hence over any field K by a base change. Using this we describe the root generators
xr(t) of the adjoint Chevalley group L(K). It turns out that the operators xr(t) are
inner conjugation automorphism [5, Lemma 4.5.1] on LK by exp(ter) which generate
an intermediate Chevalley group denoted as G¯. The group G¯ is close to groups of our
interest. In later section, we will abuse the notation slightly and denote the generators
of G¯ as xr(t) (for example in the Section 3.1). We make a table before we describe them
explicitly.
Type Group of our interest G¯ L(K)
Al SL(l + 1, K) SL(l + 1, K) PSL(l + 1, K)
Bl O(2l + 1, K) Ω2l+1(K) PΩ2l+1(K)
Cl Sp(2l, K) Sp(2l, K) PSp(2l, K)
Dl O(2l, K) Ω2l(K) PΩ2l(K)
Type Al : The Al type complex Lie algebra is sll+1(C) consisting of trace 0 matrices
of size l + 1. The set of all diagonal matrices in sll+1(C) give a Cartan subalgebra and
that Cartan decomposition gives a Chevalley basis. The roots (eigen-vectors for non-zero
eigen-values) which are part of Chevalley basis is given by Φ = {ei,j | 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ l+ 1}.
We fix a simple root system Π = {ei,i+1 | 1 ≤ i ≤ l}. A Chevalley basis is obtained by
taking union of Φ with the set {[ei,i+1, ei+1,i] | i ≤ i ≤ l}.
Thus the generators for the intermediate Chevalley group of type Al over field K are
xi,j(t) = I + tei,j where i 6= j and t ∈ K. Hence G¯ = SL(l + 1, K) and the adjoint group
is Al(K) ∼= PSL(l + 1, K).
Type Bl : The Bl type complex Lie algebra is o2l+1(C) = {X ∈ M(2l + 1,C) |
TXβ + βX = 0} where β is as in the Section 3. Any X ∈ o2l+1(C) is of the form
 0 X01 X02−2TX02 X11 X12
−2TX01 X21 −
TX11

 where X12 and X21 are skew-symmetric matrices of size l × l.
The set of diagonal matrices give a Cartan subalgebra and the Cartan decomposition
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gives us a Chevalley basis. Thus the roots in this case are Φ = {ei,j − e−j,−i,−e−i,−j +
ej,i, ei,−j − ej,−i, e−i,j − e−j,i, 2ei0 − e0,−i,−2e−i,0 + e0,i | 1 ≤ i < j ≤ l}. The simple roots
are Π = {ei,i+1 − e−(i+1),−i, 2el,0 − e0,−l | 1 ≤ i ≤ l − 1}.
In this case the intermediate Chevalley group is Ω2l+1(K) generated by the Chevalley
generators: For 1 ≤ i, j ≤ l,
xi,j(t) = I + t(ei,j − e−j,−i) for i 6= j,
xi,−j(t) = I + t(ei,−j − ej,−i) for i < j,
x−i,j(t) = I + t(−e−i,j + e−j,i) for i < j,
xi,0(t) = I + t(2ei,0 − e0,−i)− t
2ei,−i,
x0,i(t) = I + t(−2e−i,0 + e0,i)− t
2e−i,i.
The adjoint group is Bl(K) ∼= PΩ2l+1(K).
Type Cl : The complex Lie algebra of type Cl is sp2l(C) = {X ∈ M(2l,C) |
TXβ +
βX = 0} where β is as in Section 3. Any X ∈ sp2l(C) is of the form
(
X11 X12
X21 −
TX11
)
where X12 and X21 are symmetric matrices. The set of diagonal matrices is a Cartan
subalgebra and the Cartan decomposition gives a Chevalley basis. The roots in this case
are {ei,j − e−j,−i,−e−i,−j + ej,i, ei,−j + ej,−i, e−i,j + e−j,i, ei,−i, e−i,i | 1 ≤ i < j ≤ l}. The
simple roots are Π = {ei,(i+1) − e−(i+1),−i, el,−l | 1 ≤ i ≤ l − 1}.
The root generators for the group over a field K are: For 1 ≤ i, j ≤ l
xi,j(t) = I + t(ei,j − e−j,−i) for i 6= j,
xi,−j(t) = I + t(ei,−j + ej,−i) for i < j,
x−i,j(t) = I + t(e−i,j + e−j,i) for i < j,
xi,−i(t) = I + tei,−i,
x−i,i(t) = I + te−i,i
which generate the intermediate Chevalley group Sp(2l, K). The adjoint group is Cl(K) ∼=
PSp(2l, K).
Type Dl : The Dl type complex Lie algebra is o2l(C) = {X ∈M2l(C) |
TXβ+βX = 0}
where β is as in Section 3. Any X ∈ o2l(C) is of the form
(
X11 X12
X21 −
TX11
)
where X12 and
X21 are skew-symmetric matrices. The set of diagonal matrices form a Cartan subalgebra.
The roots in this case are {ei,j−e−j,−i,−e−i,−j+ej,i, ei,−j−ej,−i, e−i,j−e−j,i | 1 ≤ i < j ≤
l}. The simple roots are Π = {ei,(i+1) − e−(i+1),−i, pl = e(l−1),−l − el,−(l−1) | 1 ≤ i ≤ l− 1}.
This gives us a Chevalley basis.
The intermediate Chevalley group in this case is Ω2l(K) generated by the Chevalley
generators: For 1 ≤ i, j ≤ l
xi,j(t) = I + t(ei,j − e−j,−i) for i 6= j,
xi,−j(t) = I + t(ei,−j − ej,−i) for i < j,
x−i,j(t) = I + t(e−i,j − e−j,i) for i < j.
The adjoint group is Dl(K) ∼= PΩ2l(K).
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5. Description of Automorphism Group of Classical Groups
To build a MOR cryptosystem we need to work with the automorphism group of
Chevalley groups. In this section we describe the automorphism group of classical groups
following Dieudonne [8]. Let G be one of the following groups: adjoint or intermediate
Chevalley group of classical type or more generally the groups listed in the table in
section 4.1.
Conjugation Automorphisms: For t ∈ G the map given by g 7→ tgt−1 is an au-
tomorphism of G, called an inner automorphism. More generally if G is a normal
subgroup of N then the conjugation maps g 7→ ngn−1 for n ∈ N are called conjugation
automorphisms of G.
Central Automorphisms: Let χ : G → Z(G) be a group homomorphism to the
center of the group. Then the map g 7→ χ(g)g is an automorphism of G, known as
the central automorphism. There are no non-trivial central automorphisms for perfect
groups, for example, the adjoint Chevalley groups SL(l+1, K) and Sp(2l, K), K ≥ 4 and
l ≥ 2. In case of orthogonal group, the center is of two elements {I,−I}. Any map χ
maps Ωd(K) to identity. This implies that there are at most four central automorphisms
in this case.
Field Automorphisms: Let f ∈ Aut(K). Then the map xr(t) 7→ xr(f(t)) for all
r ∈ Φ and t ∈ K extends to an automorphism of G. These are called field automorphism.
In terms of matrices these amount to replacing each term of the matrix by its image
under f .
Graph Automorphisms: A symmetry of Dynkin diagram induces such automor-
phisms. This way we get automorphisms of order 2 for Al(K), l ≥ 2 and Dl(K), l ≥ 4.
We also get an automorphisms of order 3 forD4(K). This map is given by xr(t) 7→ xr¯(γrt)
where r 7→ r¯ is Dynkin diagram automorphism and γr = ±1.
In the case of Al for l ≥ 2, the map x 7→ A
−1Tx−1A where
A =


0 · · · 0 0 0 1
0 · · · 0 0 −1 0
0 · · · 0 1 0 0
0 · · · −1 0 0 0
... . .
. ...
...
...
...
(−1)l−1 · · · 0 0 0 0


explicitly describes the graph automorphism.
In the case of Dl for l ≥ 5, the graph automorphism is given by x 7→ B
−1xB where B
is a permutation matrix obtained from identity matrix of size 2l× 2l by switching the lth
row and −lth row. This automorphism is a conjugating automorphism.
Theorem 5.1 (Dieudonne). Let K be a field of odd characteristic and l ≥ 2.
(1) For the group SL(l + 1, K) any automorphism is of the form ιγθ where ι is a
conjugation automorphism defined by elements of GL(l + 1, K) and γ is a graph
automorphism of Al type.
(2) For the group O(d,K) any automorphism is of the form cχιθ where cχ is a central
automorphism, ι a conjugation automorphism by GO(d,K) elements (this includes
the graph automorphism of Dl case).
(3) For the group Sp(2l, K) any automorphism is of the form ιθ where ι is a conju-
gation automorphism by GSp(2l, K) elements.
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In all cases θ denotes field automorphisms.
In the above theorem, conjugation automorphisms are given by conjugation by ele-
ments of a larger group ans it includes the group of inner automorphisms. We introduce
diagonal automorphisms to make it more precise. The conjugation automorphisms ι can
be written as a product of ιg and δ where ιg is an inner automorphism and δ is a diagonal
automorphism.
Diagonal Automorphisms: The adjoint Chevalley group L(K) is normalized by
Hˆ which is a subgroup of Aut(LK). Thus for h(χ) ∈ Hˆ which is not in H gives an
automorphism g → h(χ)gh(χ)−1 (which is not an inner automorphism). Such automor-
phisms are called diagonal automorphism. The explicit action on generators is as follows:
h(χ)xr(t)h(χ)
−1 = xr(χ(r)t). The group Gˆ is identified in [20, Chapter III, Section 6]
with corresponding similitude group. In the case of Al the diagonal automorphisms are
given by conjugation by diagonal elements of PGL(l + 1, q) on Al(q) = PSL(l + 1, q). In
the case of Bl, Cl and Dl the diagonal automorphisms are given by conjugation by the
corresponding diagonal group defined in Section 3.5.
Let K be a finite field of odd characteristic and G = L(K) be an adjoint Chevalley
group over K as defined in Section 4. Steinberg described the automorphisms of these
groups. We have the following theorem [5, Theorem 12.5.1] and [22],
Theorem 5.2 (Steinberg). Let G = L(K) where L is simple and K(= Fq) is a finite
field. Let φ ∈ Aut(G). Then there exist inner, diagonal, graph and field automorphisms,
denoted by ι, δ, γ and θ respectively, such that φ = ιδγθ.
The automorphism groups of Chevalley groups over certain rings have been studied by
Bunina [3, 4].
6. Solving the word problem in G
We work with a finite field K = Fq of odd characteristic. Let G be one of the following
groups: SL(l + 1, q), O(2l + 1, q), Sp(2l, q) or O(2l, q) for l ≥ 2. Following the notation
from the theory of Chevalley groups we also call them Al, Bl, Cl or Dl type respectively.
We know that the group G is generated by Chevalley generators listed in the Section 3.1.
In fact, there are finite presentations for these groups due to Steinberg. In computational
group theory, one is always looking for algorithms that solve the word problem. Algo-
rithms for word problem are useful in other programs in computational group theory,
such as, the group recognition program and studying the membership problems in finite
groups. Extensive work on these programs are being done by several people, most notably
of those are Leedham-Green and O’Brien [16] and Guralnick et. al. [10–12]. We need an
(efficient) algorithm to write an element g ∈ G as a product of generators, i.e., a solution
to the word problem for an efficient implementation of the MOR cryptosystem.
In the case of groups of Al type, i.e., when G is a special linear group, one has the well-
known algorithm, the row-column operations. One observes that the effect of multiplying
by a Chevalley generator on a matrix from left or right is either a row or a column
operation respectively. Using this algorithm one can start with any matrix g ∈ SL(l+1, q)
and get the identity matrix thus writing g as a product of generators. One of the objective
in this paper is to develop a similar algorithm for the groups of type Bl, Cl and Dl type.
In general, one has the Bruhat decomposition for Chevalley groups which can be used to
write any element in a normal form. Every element g ∈ L(K) has a unique expression [5,
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Corollary 8.4.4] u1hnwu where u1 ∈ U, h ∈ H,w ∈ W and u ∈ U
−
w . Here we fixed a coset
representative for each w ∈ W and denote it by nw. The element n := hnw belongs to N .
Thus, the main objective of this section is to give an algorithm, in a similar line as the
row-column operations for Al, to solve the word problem for other Chevalley groups.
Cohen, Murray and Taylor [7] proposed a generalized algorithm using the row-column
operations, using a representation of Chevalley groups. The key idea there was to bring
down an element to a maximal parabolic subgroup and repeat the process inductively.
Here we use the natural matrix representation of these groups. Thus our algorithm is
more direct and works with matrices explicitly and effectively. A novelty of our algorithm
is that we do not need to assume that the Chevalley generators generate the group under
consideration. Thus our algorithm proves independently the fact that these groups are
generated by those generators.
6.1. An algorithm for row-column operations for the groups of Lie type Cl
and Dl. First we will deal with groups of Cl and Dl type. That is, we work with groups
Sp(2l, q) and O(2l, q). The Chevalley generators are described in Section 3.1. In general,
we have three kind of Chevalley generators. For 1 ≤ i, j ≤ l
CG1:
(
R
TR−1
)
where R = I + tei,j; i 6= j.
CG2:
(
I R
I
)
where R is either t(ei,−j + ej,−i) or tei,−i in the case of Cl and R is
t(ei,−j − ej,−i) in the case of Dl.
CG3:
(
I
R I
)
where R is either t(e−i,j + e−j,i) or te−i,i in the case of Cl and R is
t(e−i,j − e−j,i) in the case of Dl.
Let g =
(
A B
C D
)
be a 2l × 2l matrix. Let us note the effect of multiplying g by
elements from above.
CG1 :
(
R
TR−1
)(
A B
C D
)
=
(
RA RB
TR−1C TR−1D
)
(
A B
C D
)(
R
TR−1
)
=
(
AR BTR−1
CR DTR−1
)
.
CG2 :
(
I R
I
)(
A B
C D
)
=
(
A+RC B +RD
C D
)
(
A B
C D
)(
I R
I
)
=
(
A AR +B
C CR +D
)
.
CG3 :
(
I
R I
)(
A B
C D
)
=
(
A B
RA+ C RB +D
)
(
A B
C D
)(
I
R I
)
=
(
A +BR B
C +DR D
)
.
6.1.1. Algorithm. We produce a brief overview of the row-column operations for groups
of type Sp(2l, q) and O(2l, q).
Step 1: Input: A matrix g =
(
A B
C D
)
which belongs to Sp(2l, q) or O(2l, q).
13
Output: The matrix g1 =
(
A1 B1
C1 D1
)
is one of the following kind:
a: The matrix C1 is a diagonal matrix diag(1, 1, . . . , 1, λ) and A1 is
(
A11 A12
A21 a22
)
where A11 is symmetric in the Sp(2l, q) case and skew-symmetric in the
O(2l, q) case of size l−1. Furthermore, A12 = λ
TA21 in the Sp(2l, q) case and
A12 = −λ
TA21 in the O(2l, q) case.
b: The matrix C1 is a diagonal matrix diag(1, 1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0) with number of
1s equal tom and A1 looks like
(
A11 0
A21 A22
)
where A11 is anm×m symmetric
in the Sp(2l, q) case and skew-symmetric in the O(2l, q) case.
c: The matrices B1 and D1 are l × l.
Justification. : Observe that the effect of CG1 on C is the usual row-column
operations. Thus we can reduce C to the diagonal form and Corollary 6.2 makes
sure that A has required form.
Step 2: Input: matrix g1 =
(
A1 B1
C1 D1
)
.
Output: matrix g2 =
(
A2 B2
0 TA−12
)
; A2 is a diagonal matrix diag(1, 1, . . . , 1, λ).
Justification: Observe the effect of CG2. It changes A1 by A1 + RC1. Using
Lemma 6.5 we can make the matrix A1 the zero matrix in the first case and A11
the zero matrix in the second case. After that we make use of Lemma 6.6 to
interchange the rows so that we get zero matrix at the place of C1. If required
use CG1 to make A1 a diagonal matrix. The Lemma 6.4 ensures that D1 becomes
TA−12 .
Step 3: Input: matrix g2 =
(
A2 B2
0 TA−12
)
; A2 is a diagonal matrix diag(1, . . . , 1, λ).
Output: Matrix g3 =
(
A2 0
0 TA−12
)
; A2 is diagonal matrix diag(1, 1, . . . , 1, λ).
Justification: Using Corollary 6.3 we see that the matrix B2 has certain form.
We can use CG2 to make the matrix B2 a zero matrix because of Lemma 6.5.
Step 4: Input: matrix g3 = diag(1, . . . , 1, λ, 1, . . . , 1, λ
−1).
Output: Identity matrix
Justification: In the case of Sp(2l, q) the diagonal matrix can be written as a
product of generators by first part of Lemma 6.7. In the case of O(2l, q), using
second part of Lemma 6.7 we can reduce to diag(1, . . . , 1, ζ, 1, . . . , 1, ζ−1) where ζ
is a fixed non-square in Fq. Thus multiplying with d(ζ)
−1 we get the result.
6.2. Time-complexity of the above algorithm. We establish that the time-complexity
of the above algorithm is O(l3).
In Step 1, we are making C a diagonal matrix by row-column operations. That
has complexity O(l3).
In Step 2, A1 + RC1 is two field multiplications and two additions. In the worst
case, it has to be done l2 times and so the complexity is O(l2).
Step 3 is similar to Step 2 above and has complexity O(l2).
Step 4 has only a few steps that is independent of l.
Then clearly, the time-complexity of our algorithm is O(l3).
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6.3. Flowchart of the above algorithm. The input to the algorithm is a 2l×2l matrix
in Sp(2l, q) or O(2l, q) represented as blocks of size l.
(
A B
C D
)
uu❦❦
❦❦
❦❦
❦❦
❦❦
❦❦
❦❦
❦❦
❦
**❚
❚❚
❚❚
❚❚
❚❚
❚❚
❚❚
❚❚
❚❚
❚❚
❚❚
❚
Each block is of size l × l
([
A11 ±λ
TA21
A21 a
]
∗[
Il−1
λ
]
∗
)

A11 = ±
TA11(use CG1)
(
[ A11 0l−m
∗ ∗
] ∗[
Im
0l−m
]
∗
)
(
0l ∗[
Il−1
λ
]
∗
)

use CG2
([
0m×l
∗(l−m)×l
]
∗[
Im
0l−m
]
∗
)
([
Il−1
λ
]
∗
0l ∗
)
''❖
❖❖
❖❖
❖❖
❖❖
❖❖
row flipping, use CG2, CG3
(
[ Im 0∗ ∗ ] ∗
0l ∗
)
vv♠♠
♠♠
♠♠
♠♠
♠♠
♠♠
♠♠


[
1
...
1
λ
]
∗
0l
[
1
...
1
λ−1
]



use CG1


[
1
...
1
λ
]
0l
0l
[
1
...
1
λ−1
]



use CG2
I2l use CG1, CG2, CG3
6.4. Useful lemmas. In this section we set notation and prove lemmas which were used
(and will be used) to justify the above algorithm (and the later algorithm). Some of
these might be well known to experts but we include them here for the convenience of
the reader. We make use of the following while computing with matrices:
ei,jek,l = δjkei,l where δjk is the Kronecker delta.
Lemma 6.1. Let Y = diag(1, . . . , 1, λ, . . . , λ) of size l with number of 1s equal to m <
l. Let X be a matrix such that Y X is symmetric (skew-symmetric) then X is of the
form
(
X11 λ
TX21
X21 X22
)
where X11 is symmetric (skew symmetric) and X12 = λ
TX21 (X12 =
−λTX21).
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Proof. We observe that the matrix Y X =
(
X11 X12
λX21 λX22
)
. The condition that Y X is
symmetric implies X11 (and X22 if λ 6= 0) is symmetric and X12 = λ
TX21. •
Corollary 6.2. Let g =
(
A B
C D
)
be either in Sp(2l, q) or O(2l, q).
(1) If C is a diagonal matrix diag(1, 1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0) with number of 1s equal to
m < l then the matrix A has to be of the form
(
A11 0
A21 A22
)
where A11 is an
m×m symmetric if g is symplectic and is skew-symmetric if g is orthogonal.
(2) If C is a diagonal matrix diag(1, 1, . . . , 1, λ) then the matrix A has to be of the
form
(
A11 λ
TA21
A21 A22
)
where A11 is an (l− 1)× (l− 1) symmetric if g is symplectic
and is skew-symmetric if g is orthogonal.
Proof. We use the condition that g satisfies Tgβg = β.
Tgβg =
(
TA TC
TB TD
)(
I
±I
)(
A B
C D
)
=
(
±TC TA
±TD TB
)(
A B
C D
)
=
(
±TCA+ TAC ∗
∗ ∗
)
This gives ±TCA+TAC = 0 which means CA is symmetric (note C = TC as C is diagonal)
if g is symplectic and is skew-symmetric if g is orthogonal. The Lemma 6.1 gives the
required form for A. •
Corollary 6.3. Let g =
(
A B
0 A−1
)
where A = diag(1, . . . , 1, λ) be an element of either
Sp(2l, q) or O(2l, q) then the matrix B is of the form
(
B11 λ
TB21
B21 B22
)
where B11 is a
symmetric matrix of size l−1 if g is symplectic and is skew-symmetric if g is orthogonal.
Proof. Yet again, we use the condition that g satisfies Tgβg = β and A = TA.
Tgβg =
(
A
TB A−1
)(
I
±I
)(
A B
A−1
)
=
(
A
±A−1 TB
)(
A B
A−1
)
=
(
I
±I ±A−1B + TBA−1
)
This gives ±A−1B + TBA−1 = 0 which means A−1B is symmetric if g is symplectic and
is skew-symmetric if g is orthogonal. Then Lemma 6.1 gives the required form for B. •
Lemma 6.4. Let g =
(
A ∗
0 D
)
∈ GL(2l, q). If g belongs to Sp(2l, q) or O(2l, q) then
D = TA−1.
Proof. We use Tgβg = β.(
I
±I
)
= β = Tgβg =
(
TA 0
∗ TD
)(
I
±I
)(
A ∗
0 D
)
=
(
0 TA
±TD ∗
)(
A ∗
0 D
)
=
(
0 TAD
±TDA ∗
)
This gives TAD = I. •
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Lemma 6.5. Let Y = diag(1, 1, . . . , 1, λ) be of size l where λ 6= 0 and X = (xij) be a
matrix such that Y X is symmetric (skew-symmetric). Then X = (R1+R2+ . . .)Y where
each Rm is of the form t(ei,j + ej,i) for some i < j or of the form tei,i for some i (in the
case of skew-symmetric each Rm is of the form t(ei,j − ej,i) for some i < j).
Proof. Since Y X is symmetric, the matrix X is of the following form (see Lemma 6.1):(
X11 X12
X21 xnn
)
where X11 is symmetric and X21 is a row of size l − 1 (xl1xl2 · · ·xl,l−1) and
X12 = λ
TX21. Clearly any such matrix is sum of the matrices of the form RY . A similar
calculation proves the result in the skew-symmetric case. •
We need certain Weyl group elements which can be used for switching rows.
Lemma 6.6. With the indexing of basis as 1, . . . , l,−1, . . . ,−l, for any matrix g in
Sp(2l, q) or O(2l, q), the ith row can be interchanged with −ith row with possibly a sign
change. Further, we can do the same in O(2l + 1, q).
Proof. For the symplectic group Sp(2l, q) consider the following root generators: xi,−i =
I+ ei,−i and yi,−i = I− e−i,i. Then the element wi,−i = xi,−iyi,−ixi,−i is in the Weyl group
and multiplication by this element to a matrix g has desired property.
wi,−i = xi,−iyi,−ixi,−i = (I + ei,−i)(I − e−i,i)(I + ei,−i)
= (I + ei,−i − e−i,i − ei,i)(I + ei,−i)
= I + ei,−i − e−i,i − ei,i − e−i,−i.
In the matrix form:

1 1
1
1
1




1
1
−1 1
1




1 1
1
1
1

 =


1
1
−1
1

 .
For the orthogonal group O(2l, q) consider the following root generators: xij = I +
(ei,−j − ej,−i) and yij = I + (e−i,j − e−j,i) for i < j. Then the element wij = xijyijxij is
in the Weyl group and multiplication by this element to a matrix g changes ith row with
−jth row with a sign change and jth row with −ith row with a sign change simultaneously.
wij = xijyijxij = (I + ei,−j − ej,−i)(I + e−i,j − e−j,i)(I + ei,−j − ej,−i)
= (I + e−i,j − e−j,i + ei,−j + ei,−je−i,j − ei,−je−j,i − ej,−i − ej,−ie−i,j
+ej,−ie−j,i)(I + ei,−j − ej,−i)
= (I + e−i,j − e−j,i + ei,−j − ei,i − ej,−i − ej,j)(I + ei,−j − ej,−i)
= I − ei,i − ej,j − e−i,−i − e−j,−j + ei,−j − ej,−i + e−i,j − e−j,i.
In the matrix form:

1 1
1 −1
1
1




1
1
1 1
−1 1




1 1
1 −1
1
1

 =


1
−1
1
−1

 .
Also since GL(l, q) embeds inside O(2l, q) via A 7→
(
A
TA−1
)
the CG1 generators
generate the subgroup SL(l, q) and we have corresponding Weyl group elements, σij = I−
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ei,i−ej,j+ei,j−ej,i−e−i,−i−e−j,−j+e−i,−j−e−j,−i which interchanges i
th to jth row and−ith
to −jth row simultaneously with a sign change. We have the extra generator wl ∈ O(2l, q)
which interchanges lth row with −lth row with a sign change. We can compute and check
that wl−1 = wlσl,l−1wl,l−1 = I − el−1,l−1 − e−(l−1),−(l−1) − e(l−1),−(l−1) − e−(l−1),(l−1) which
interchanges l−1th row with −(l−1)th row (possibly with a sign change) and inductively
we can produce wi which interchanges i
th row with −ith row possibly with a sign change.
In the matrix form:
w3σ23w23 =


1
1
−1
1
1
−1




1
−1
1
1
−1
1




1
−1
1
1
−1
1


=


1
−1
1
1
−1
1

 = w2.
Further notice that O(2l, q) is embedded inside O(2l+1, q). Thus we can do the same in
O(2l + 1, q) as well. •
Lemma 6.7. (1) In the case of Sp(2l, q), the element diag(1, . . . , 1λ︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
, 1, . . . , 1, λ−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
) is
a product of Chevalley generators.
(2) In the case of O(2l, q), the element diag(1, . . . , 1λ︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
, 1, . . . , 1, λ−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
) is a product of
Chevalley generators where λ ∈ F×q
2
.
(3) In the case of O(2l+1, q) diagonal elements diag(1, 1, . . . , 1λ︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
, 1, . . . , 1, λ−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
) where
λ ∈ F×2q and diag(−1, 1, . . . , 1) are a product of Chevalley generators.
Proof. In the case of Sp(2l, q), we compute wl,−l(t) = (I+ tel,−l)(I− t
−1e−l,l)(I+ tel,−l) =
I − el,l− e−l,−l+ tel,−l− t
−1e−l,l and then compute hl(λ) = wl,−l(λ)wl,−l(−1) which is the
required element.
In the case of O(2l, q), we compute wl−1,−l(t) = (I+tel−1,−l−tel,−(l−1))(I+t
−1e−(l−1),l−
t−1e−l,l−1)(I + tel−1,−l − tel,−(l−1)) = I + t
−1e−(l−1),l − e−(l−1),−(l−1) − t
−1e−l,l−1 − e−l,−l +
tel−1,−l − el−1,l−1 − tel,−(l−1) − el,l and
hl−1,−l(t) = wl−1,l(t)wl−1,l(−1) = diag(1, . . . , 1, t, t︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
, 1 . . . , 1, t−1, t−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
)
. Similarly we compute σl−1,l(t) = (I+ tel−1,l+ te−l,−(l−1))(I− t
−1el,l−1− t
−1e−(l−1),−l)(I+
tel−1,l+te−l,−(l−1)) and hl−1,l(t) = σl−1,l(t)σl−1,l(−1) = diag(1, . . . , 1, t, t
−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
, 1, . . . , 1, t−1, t︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
).
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In the matrix form:
w2,−3(t) =


1
1 t
1 −t
1
1
1




1
1
1
1
t−1 1
−t−1 1




1
1 t
1 −t
1
1
1


=


1
0 t
0 −t
1
t−1 0
−t−1 0

 .
and
h2,−3(t) = w2,−3(t)w2,−3(−1) =


1
0 t
0 −t
1
t−1 0
−t−1 0




1
0 −1
0 1
1
−1 0
1 0


=


1
t
t
1
t−1
t−1

 .
Furthermore,
σ23(t) =


1
0 t
−t−1 0
1
0 −t−1
t 0

 and h23(t) = σ23(t)σ23(−1) =


1
t
t−1
1
t−1
t

.
Thus multiplying hl−1,−l(t) and hl−1,l(t
−1) we get the required result.
In the case of O(2l+1, q) we compute wl,0 = xl,0(1)x0,l(−1)xl,0(1) = I− e−l,−l− e−l,l−
el,l − 2e0,0 − el,−l and multiply it with wl to get the required matrix. •
Lemma 6.8. Let g =

α X ∗∗ A ∗
∗ C ∗

 be in O(2l + 1, q).
(1) If C = diag(1, . . . , 1, λ) and X = 0 then A is of the form
(
A11 −λ
TA21
A21 a
)
with
A11 skew-symmetric.
(2) If C = diag(1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0) with number of 1s equal m < l and X has first m
entries 0 then A is of the form
(
A11 0
∗ ∗
)
with A11 skew-symmetric.
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Proof. We use the equation Tgβg = β and get 2TXX = −(CA + TAC). In the first case
X = 0, so we can use 6.2 to get required form for A. In the second case we note that
TXX has top-left block 0 and get the required form. •
Lemma 6.9. Let g =

α X Y∗ A ∗
∗ 0 D

 be in O(2l + 1, q) then X = 0 and D = TA−1.
Proof. We compute Tgβg = β and get 2TXX = 0 and 2TXY + TAD = I. This gives the
required result. •
Lemma 6.10. Let g =

α 0 Y0 A B
F 0 D

, with A an invertible diagonal matrix, be in O(2l+
1, q) then α2 = 1, F = 0 = Y , D = A−1 and TDB + TBD = 0.
Proof.
Tgβg =

 α 0 TF0 TA 0
TY TB TD



2 I
I



α 0 Y0 A B
F 0 D


=

 2α2 TFA 2αY + TFBTAF 0 TAD
2αTY + TBF TDA 2TY Y + TDB + TBD

 .
Equating this with β we get the required result. •
Lemma 6.11. Let g =

±1 0 00 A B
0 0 A−1

 ∈ O(2l + 1, q) where A = diag(1, . . . , 1, λ) is
invertible then B is of the form
(
B11 λ
−1TB21
B21 b
)
.
Proof. This follows from the computation in the Lemma 6.10 that A−1B + TBA−1 = 0
and Corollary 6.2. •
6.5. An algorithm for row-column operations for the groups of Lie type Bl.
Here we work with the group O(2l + 1, q). Recall that the basis will be indexed by
0, 1, . . . , l,−1, . . . ,−l. The Chevalley generators are described in the Section 3.1. In
general, we have four kind of Chevalley generators. For 1 ≤ i, j ≤ l
CG1:

1 R
TR−1

 where R = I + tei,j ; i 6= j.
CG2:

1 I R
I

 where R is t(ei,−j − ej,−i); i < j.
CG3:

1 I
R I

 where R is t(e−i,j − e−j,i); i < j.
CG4: I + t(2ei0 − e0,−i)− t
2ei,−i, I + t(−2e−i,0 + e0i)− t
2e−i,i.
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We observe that CG1, CG2 and CG3 generate the subgroup O(2l, q) of O(2l + 1, q)
given by x 7→
(
1
x
)
. Let g =

α X YE A B
F C D

 be a (2l + 1) × (2l + 1) matrix where
A,B,C,D are l × l matrices. The matrices X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xl), Y = (Y1, Y2, . . . , Yl),
E = T(E1, E2, . . . , El) and F =
T(F1, F2, . . . , Fl). Let α ∈ Fq. Let us note the effect of
multiplication by elements of one of the types from above.
CG1 :

1 R
TR−1



α X YE A B
F C D

 =

 α X YRE RA RB
TR−1F TR−1C TR−1D



α X YE A B
F C D



1 R
TR−1

 =

α XR Y TR−1E AR BTR−1
F CR DTR−1

 .
CG2 :

1 I R
I



α X YE A B
F C D

 =

 α X YE +RF A+RC B +RD
F C D



α X YE A B
F C D



1 I R
I

 =

α X XR + YE A AR +B
F C CR +D

 .
CG3 :

1 I
R I



α X YE A B
F C D

 =

 α X YE A B
RE + F RA+ C RB +D



α X YE A B
F C D



1 I
R I

 =

α X + Y R YE A+BR B
F C +DR D

 .
CG4: We only write equations that we need.
• Let the matrix g has C = diag(d1, . . . , dl).
[(I + te0,−i − 2tei,0 − t
2ei,−i)g]0,i = Xi + tdi
[g(I + te0,−i − 2tei,0 − t
2ei,−i)]−i,0 = Fi − 2tdi.
• Let the matrix g has A = diag(d1, . . . , dl).
[(I + te0,i − 2te−i,0 − t
2e−i,i)g]0,i = Xi − tdi
[g(I + te0,−i − 2tei,0 − t
2ei,−i)]i,0 = Ei − 2tdi.
6.5.1. The Algorithm. An overview of the algorithm is as follows:
Step 1: Input: matrix g =

α X YE A B
F C D

 which belongs to O(2l + 1, q);
Output: matrix g1 =

 α X1 Y1E1 A1 B1
F1 C1 D1

 of one of the following kind:
a: C1 is a diagonal matrix diag(1, . . . , 1, λ) with λ 6= 0.
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b: C1 is a diagonal matrix diag(1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0) with number of 1s equal to m
and m < l.
Justification: Using CG1 we can do row and column operations on C.
Step 2: Input: matrix g1 =

 α X1 Y1E1 A1 B1
F1 C1 D1

.
Output: matrix g2 =

α2 X2 Y2E2 A2 B2
F2 C2 D2

 of one of the following kind:
a: C2 is diag(1, 1, . . . , 1, λ) with λ 6= 0, X2 = 0 = F2 and A2 is of the form(
A11 A12
A21 a22
)
where A11 is skew-symmetric of size l − 1 and A12 = −λ
TA21.
b: C2 is diag(1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0) with number of 1s equal to m; X2 and F2 have
first m entries 0, and A2 is of the form
(
A11 0
A21 A22
)
where A11 is an m×m
skew-symmetric.
Justification: Once we have C1 in diagonal form we use CG4 to change X1 and
F1 in the required form. Then Lemma 6.8 makes sure that A1 has required form.
Step 3: Input: matrix g2 =

α2 X2 Y2E2 A2 B2
F2 C2 D2

.
Output:
a: matrix g3 =

α3 0 Y3E3 0 B3
0 C3 D3

 where C3 is diag(1, 1, . . . , 1, λ).
b: matrix g3 =

α3 X3 Y3E3 A3 B3
F3 C3 D3

 where C3 is diag(1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0) with number
of 1s equal to m; X3 and F3 have first m entries 0, and A3 is of the form(
0 0
A21 A22
)
.
Justification: Observe the effect of CG2 and the Lemma 6.5 ensures the required
form.
Step 4: Input: g3 =

α3 X3 Y3E3 A3 B3
F3 C3 D3

.
Output: g4 =

±1 0 00 A4 B4
0 0 A−14

 with A4 diagonal matrix diag(1, . . . , 1, λ).
Justification: In the first case, interchange rows i and −i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ l. Now
the matrix is in the form so that we can apply Lemma 6.10 and get the required
result. In the second case we interchange i with −i for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. This will make
C3 = 0. Then if needed we use CG1 on A3 to make it diagonal. The Lemma 6.9
ensures that A3 has full rank. Further we can use CG4 to make X3 = 0 and
E3 = 0. The Lemma 6.10 gives the required form.
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Step 5: Input: g4 =

±1 0 00 A4 B4
0 0 A−14

 with A4 = diag(1, . . . , 1, λ).
Output: g5 = diag(±1, 1 . . . , 1, λ, 1, . . . , 1, λ
−1).
Justification: Lemma 6.11 ensures that B4 is of a certain kind. We can use CG2
to make B4 = 0.
Step 6: Input: matrix diag(±1, 1, . . . , 1, λ, 1, . . . , 1, λ−1).
Output: Identity matrix.
Justification: Write λ as ζ times a square and use the third part of Lemma 6.7 to
reduce the matrix to diag(1, 1, . . . , 1, ζ, 1, . . . , 1, ζ−1) where ζ is a fixed non-square.
Now multiplying with d(ζ) we get the required result.
7. Security of the proposed MOR cryptosystem
The purpose of this section is to show that for a secure MOR cryptosystem over the
classical Chevalley groups we have to look at automorphisms that act by conjugation, like
the inner automorphisms. There are other automorphisms that also act by conjugation,
like the diagonal automorphism and the graph automorphism for Dl type. Then we argue
what is the hardness of our security assumptions.
Let φ be an automorphism of one of the classical Chevalley groupsG: SL(l+1, q),O(2l+
1, q), Sp(2l, q), or O(2l, q) of Al, Bl, Cl or Dl type respectively. The automorphisms of
these groups are described in Section 5. From Theorem 5.1 we know that φ = cχιδγθ
where cχ is a central automorphism, ι is an inner automorphism, δ is a diagonal auto-
morphism, γ is a graph automorphism and θ is a field automorphism.
The group of central automorphisms are too small and the field automorphisms reduce
to a discrete logarithm in the field Fq. So there is no benefit of using these in a MOR
cryptosystem. Also there are not many graph automorphisms in classical Chevalley
groups other than the Al and Dl case. In the Dl case these automorphisms act by
conjugation. Recall here that, our automorphisms are presented as action on generators.
It is clear [17, Section 7] that if we can recover the conjugating matrix from the action
on generators, then the security is Fqd, if not then the security is Fqd2 .
So from these we conclude that for a secure MOR cryptosystem we must look at auto-
morphisms that act by conjugation, like the inner automorphisms. Inner automorphisms
form a normal subgroup of Aut(G) and usually constitute the bulk of automorphisms. If φ
is an inner automorphism, say ιg : x 7→ gxg
−1, we would like to determine the conjugating
element g. For Al, the special linear group, it was done in [17]. We will follow the steps
there for the present situation too. However, before we do that, let us digress briefly to
observe that G→ Inn(G) given by g 7→ ιg is a surjective group homomorphism. Thus if
G is generated by g1, g2, . . . , gs then Inn(G) is generated by ιg1 , . . . , ιgs. Let φ ∈ Inn(G).
If we can find gj, j = 1, 2, . . . , r, generators, such that φ =
r∏
j=1
ιgj then φ = ιg where
g =
r∏
j=1
gj . This implies that our problem is equivalent to solving the word problem in
Inn(G). Note that solving word problem depends on how the group is represented and
it is not invariant under group homomorphisms. Thus the algorithm described earlier to
solve the word problem in the classical Chevalley groups does not help us in the present
case.
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7.1. Reduction of security. In this subsection, we show that for Al and Cl case, the
security of the MOR cryptosystem is the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem in
Fqd. This is the same as saying that we can find the conjugating matrix up to a scalar
multiple. We further show that the method that works for Al and Cl does not work for
Bl and Dl. Let φ be an automorphism that works by conjugation, i.e., φ = ιg for some g
and we try to determine g.
Step 1: The automorphism φ is presented as action on generators xr(t) = I + ter
except CG4 in Bl type. Thus φ(xr(t)) = g(I + ter)g
−1 = I + tgerg
−1 where r ∈ Φ. This
implies that we know gerg
−1 for all r ∈ Φ. We first claim that we can determine N := gD
where D is sparse, in fact, diagonal in the case of Al and Cl type.
In the case of Al, write g = [G1, . . . , Gi, . . . , Gl+1], where Gi are column vectors of
g. Then gei,j = [G1, . . . , Gl+1] ei,j = [0, . . . , 0, Gi, 0 . . . , 0] where Gi is at the j
th place.
Multiplying this with g−1 on the right, i. e., computing gei,jg
−1 determines Gi up to a
scalar multiple, say di. Thus, we know N = gD where D = diag(d1, . . . , dl+1).
For the Cl type we do the similar computation with the generators I + tei,−i and
I + te−i,i. Write g in the column form as [G1, . . . Gl, G−1, . . . , G−l]. Now,
(1) [G1, . . . Gl, G−1, . . . , G−l] ei,−i = [0, . . . , 0, Gi, 0, . . . , 0] where Gi is at −i
th place.
Multiplying this further with g−1 gives us scalar multiple of Gi, say di.
(2) [G1, . . . Gl, G−1, . . . , G−l] e−i,i = [0, . . . , 0, G−i, 0, . . . , 0] where G−i is at i
th place.
Multiplying this with g−1 gives us scalar multiple of G−i, say d−i.
Thus we get N = gD where D is a diagonal matrix diag(d1, . . . , dl, d−1, . . . , d−l).
For Dl type, write g = [G1, . . . Gl, G−1, . . . , G−l]. Now computing gerg
−1 gives the
following equations:
(1) [G1, . . . Gl, G−1, . . . , G−l] (ei,j − e−j,−i)g
−1 = [0, . . . , 0, Gi, 0 . . . , 0, G−j, 0, . . .] g
−1
where Gi is at j
th place and G−j is at −i
th place. This gives us linear combi-
nation of the columns Gi and G−j.
(2) [G1, . . . Gl, G−1, . . . , G−l] (ei,−j−ej,−i)g
−1 = [0, . . . , 0, Gi, 0 . . . , 0, Gj, 0, . . .] g
−1 where
Gi is at −j
th place and Gj is at −i
th place. This will give us linear combination
of the columns Gi and Gj.
(3) [G1, . . . Gl, G−1, . . . , G−l] (e−i,j − e−j,i)g
−1 = [0, . . . , 0, G−i, 0 . . . , 0, G−j, 0, . . .] g
−1
where G−i is at j
th place and G−j is at i
th place. This will give us linear combi-
nation of the columns G−i and G−j.
Thus we get N = gD where D is of the form
(
W X
Y Z
)
with W a diagonal matrix, Y
anti-diagonal, X has first column nonzero and Z has the last column nonzero. This is
not a diagonal matrix. One can do a similar computation for Bl type.
Step 2: Now we compute N−1φ(xr(t))N = D
−1g−1(gxr(t)g
−1)gD = I+D−1erD which
is equivalent to computing D−1erD for r ∈ Φ.
In the case of Al we have D diagonal. Thus by computing D
−1ei,jD we determine
d−1i dj for i 6= j and form a matrix diag(1, d
−1
2 d1, . . . , d
−1
l d1) and multiply this to N we
get d1g. Hence we can determine g up to a scalar matrix.
In the Cl case we can do similar computation asD is diagonal. First compute D
−1(ei,j−
e−j,−i)D to get d
−1
i dj and d
−1
−id−j for i 6= j. Now compute D
−1ei,−iD,D
−1e−i,iD to get
did
−1
−i , d−id
−1
i . We form a matrix
diag(1, d−12 d1, . . . , d
−1
l d1, d
−1
−1d−2.d
−1
−2d2.d
−1
2 d1, . . . , d
−1
−l d−1.d
−1
−1d1)
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and multiply it to N = gD to get d1g. Thus we can determine g up to a scalar multiple
and then the attack follows [17, Section 7.1.1].
However in the case of Bl and Dl the matrix D is not a diagonal matrix and the above
method to determine g does not work.
8. Conclusion
This section is similar to [17, Section 8]. An useful public-key cryptosystem is a delicate
dance between speed and the security. So one must talk about speed along with security.
As we said in the introduction, this study was to find the embedding degree for the
symplectic and orthogonal groups over finite fields of odd characteristic. So we will be
somewhat brief with implementation details.
The implementation that we have in mind uses the row-column operations. Let
〈g1, g2, . . . , gs〉 be a set of generators for the orthogonal or symplectic group as described
before. As is the custom with a MOR cryptosystem, the automorphisms φ and φm
are presented as action on generators, i.e., we have φ(gi) and φ
m(gi) as matrices for
i = 1, 2, . . . , s.
To encrypt a message in this MOR cryptosystem, we compute φr. We do that by
square-and-multiply algorithm. For this implementation, squaring and multiplying is
almost the same. So we will refer to both squaring and multiplication as multiplication.
Note that multiplication is composing of automorphisms.
The implementation that we describe in this paper, can work in parallel. Each instance
computes pir(gi) for i = 1, 2, . . . , s. First thing that we do is write the matrix of φ(gi)
as a word in generators. So essentially the map φ becomes a map gi 7→ wi where wi
is a word in generators of some fixed length. Then multiplication becomes essentially a
replacement, replace all instances of gi by wi. This can be done very fast. However, the
length of the replaced word can become very large. The obvious question is, how soon
are we going to write this word as a matrix. This is a difficult question to answer at this
stage and depends on available computational resources.
Once we decide how often we change back to matrices, how are we going to change
back to matrices? There can be a fairly easy time-memory trade-offs. Write all words
up to a fixed length and the corresponding matrix as a pre-computed table and use this
table to compute the matrices. Once we have matrices, we can multiply them together to
generate the final output. If writing all words is impossible, due to resource constraint,
write some of it in a table. There are also many obvious relations among the generators
of these groups. One can just store and use them. The best strategy for an efficient
implementation is yet to be determined. It is clear now that there are many interesting
and novel choices.
The benefits of this MOR cryptosystem are:
: This can be implemented in parallel easily.
: This implementation doesn’t depend on the size of the characteristic of the field.
This is an important property in light of Joux’s recent improvement of the index-
calculus attacks [2].
There is one issue with this MOR cryptosystem, the key-size is large. For parameters
and complexity analysis of this cryptosystem, we refer to [17, Section 8].
8.1. Further Research. We conclude this paper with two open directions for further
research.
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: What is the most efficient strategy to implement the MOR cryptosystem on Or-
thogonal and Symplectic groups that we described earlier?
: What is the security for the twisted groups?
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